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Abstract 
 
 
Systemic risks and hazards have become increasingly significant features of modern industrial 
society of which the network industries form a vital element. The idea of systemic risk, however, 
is much less prominent in the network industries compared to banking and finance. This paper 
addresses why there is such a difference between these sectors. It then addresses how complexity 
and systemic risk in the network industries should be managed and governed. Does it above all 
require more and better scientific and technical analysis to understand the risks and reduce 
uncertainty? Or does it require qualitatively different forms of governance that draw on many 
different types of knowledge, and involve a wider range of stakeholders? We argue in this paper 
that systemic risk is very important in the network industries and it needs to be a considered more 
explicitly than hitherto in the governance and regulation of risk in the network industries. 
Traditional technocratic forms of risk management and governance while necessary are not 
sufficient, particularly due because of heightened uncertainty and interdependence. Unless and 
until the problems of uncertainty are overcome, means of governing risk and uncertainty beyond 
the technocratic are required. In particular, judgements by different experts and stakeholders are 
required about the nature of the uncertainty, about the potential hazards and their consequences, 
and about the level of caution required. This requires a more participative and open form of risk 
governance, a form which draws on socio-political forms of governance as well as technocratic. 
This is recognised in part in the recent literature on risk governance of critical infrastructures but 
the literature says little about the participative governance structures which might be appropriate 
nor how they may be developed in the patchwork that is the European regulatory environment for 
the network industries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The network industries – gas, electricity, transport, communications, water supply – are 
commonly seen as ‘critical’ infrastructures: they provide services without which modern society 
could not function and modern life would not be tenable. They are also examples of ‘systems’ or 
‘systems of systems’ which, by their nature, are subject to whole system risks – often referred to 
as ‘systemic’ risks. Broadly, ‘systemic risk refers to the risk or probability of breakdowns in an 
entire system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components, and is evidenced by 
comovements (correlation) among all or most parts’ (Kaufman and Scott, 2003: 371). Systemic 
risk is often also used to refer to risk of failure of vitally important systems. For example, in a 
major report on systemic risk, the OECD refers to it as ‘one that affects the systems on which 
society depends - health, transport, environment, telecommunications etc’ (OECD, 2003: 30). 
 
One reason for the concern about systemic risk is that it has become ever more prevalent and 
important in the modern world: there are significant ‘emerging systemic risks’ (OECD, 2003). 
Reasons are multiple (OECD, 2003: 30-31).They include firstly demographic trends with global 
population expected to rise by about 50%, particularly in urban areas in developing countries 
becoming increasingly dependent on modern systems. Secondly, environmental pressures and 
problems, notably related to global warming are expected to increase and to enhance the 
vulnerability of critical systems. Thirdly, technological changes are expected to continue apace 
leading to more and more complexity and interconnectedness of critical systems. Fourthly, socio-
economic changes brought on by increased competition and economic growth, notably social and 
geographic inequalities in development, are likely to increase risks.  
 
Increasing technological, social and economical interconnectedness brings with it many 
advantages but it is also accompanied by increasing vulnerabilities. More and more people 
become dependent on and affected by technological systems. Emergent systemic phenomena or 
‘surprises’ are also likely. Analysis of the modern systems is often done on a component parts 
basis and systems are designed on the premise of bounded use and connection. However, their 
use evolves and becomes more integrated with other systems potentially leading the emergence 
of unforeseen systemic characteristics which might have negative consequences. 
 
These trends of interconnectedness, interdependence and systemic risk have become inherent 
features of the network industries. A number of observations and questions about systemic risk in 
the network industries can be made. Firstly, there is a notable difference in the prominence of the 
concept of systemic risk in the academic literature (and practice) of banking and finance, where it 
is highly prominent, compared to the literature on risk in the network industries and ‘critical 
infrastructure’ risk where it is much less prominent. In the extensive academic and practitioner 
literature on risk in banking and finance, systemic risk is frequently and explicitly addressed and 
analysed and is one of the most important concepts in the sector (see e.g. Kaufman and Scott, 
2003; Kambhu, Weidman et al., 2007; Milne, 2007). In contrast, while safety and reliability in 
the network industries and critical infrastructures is extensively analysed, systemic risk is only 
referenced briefly in the literature and not subject to extended and explicit analysis (IRGC, 2006; 
Zimmerman and Restrepo, 2006; Gheorghe, Masera et al., 2007). The associated term, 
‘cascading’, is referred to more frequently but still not subject to intensive analysis.  
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A second observation of the network industries is that there are arguments and some evidence 
that these industries are increasingly vulnerable to systemic failures. Technological change can be 
disruptive to established steady states, ‘innovation trajectories … can cascade in unforeseen 
ways’, particularly when technological systems rapidly expand into other systems and areas or 
life (Hellström, 2007: 417). The development of IT and the internet is a highly prominent 
example of this trend. Similar developments have occurred in other apparently more stable and 
established infrastructure industries such as electricity supply. It has been argued, for example, 
that electricity supply networks are becoming more integrated with the internet. This integration 
is occurring both ways: internet systems are used more and more for control and communications 
of the power transmission system while the latter is used as part of the communications system 
for the internet. Also due to liberalisation and internationalisation, particularly in Europe, they are 
being operated well outside their original design parameters (Gheorghe, 2006; IRGC, 2006; 
Kröger, 2008).  
 
There have also been some significant systemic failures in the electricity supply system across 
Europe, for example, in 2003 transmission system fault in Switzerland led to a loss of supply 
across the whole of Italy for almost a day (Gheorghe et al, 2006). While it is not fully clear that 
there has been an increase in failures in Europe in the last decade or two, there is statistical data 
from the US and Canada which suggests a gradual increase in system failures since the 1980s 
(Zimmerman and Restrepo, 2006: 219-220). 
 
These observations raise questions such as: why is there such a difference between the banking 
and the network industries in the prominence of the concept of systemic risk? Does it reflect big 
cross-sectoral differences in its significance? Or does it just reflect cross-disciplinary differences 
in terminology? Also how should complexity and systemic risk in the network industries, which 
has been especially compounded by market liberalisation, be managed and governed? Does it 
above all require more and better scientific and technical analysis to understand the risks and 
reduce uncertainty? Or does it require qualitatively different forms of governance that draw on 
many different types of knowledge, and involve a wider range of stakeholders? The latter might 
involve a shift from ‘risk management’ to ‘risk governance’ (Sajeva and Masera, 2006; Kröger, 
2008) involving more deliberation and participation (Klinke and Renn, 2006). 
 
2. What is systemic risk? 
 
Before considering systemic risk in relation to the network industries it is useful to consider what 
the concept of systemic risk refers to. The concept of risk itself is not easy to delineate and in 
modern usage is closely associated with the notion of hazard. While the latter is the capacity or 
potential to do harm, risk is more to do with ‘possibilities, chances or likelihoods of events, often 
as consequences of some activity or policy’ (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006: 1). Nevertheless in 
most risk analysis and debate risk is associated with harmful outcomes and is thought of as the 
likelihood of a harm occurring combined in some way with the extent of the harm. Risk therefore 
involves two elements: (i) the likelihood or probability of a particular event occurring and (ii) the 
extent of the harmful consequences of the event. 
 
A standard technical definition involves quantification and is the statistical probability of the 
occurrence of the unwanted event multiplied by its severity (Hansson, 2007). However, there are 
3 
 
extended debates on risk and uncertainty in the literature, particularly between a scientific view 
which sees risk as a statistical probability of harm and uncertainty when probabilities cannot be 
quantified and a social science view which sees risk and uncertainty in most practical situations 
as difficult to separate and is sceptical about the quantification of outcome probabilities.1 
 
As noted above, the concept of systemic risk refers to breakdowns of whole systems rather than 
their component parts. Systemic risk therefore appears to be distinguishable from other kinds of 
risk primarily in terms of the widespread and potentially damaging consequences. Nevertheless, 
definitions of systemic risk often focus on the cause of the harm, processes involved and the 
uncertainties in assessing the likely outcomes.   
 
Systemic risk in banking: macro and micro causes 
The literature on systemic risk in banking and finance is extensive and is an obvious starting 
point when considering the nature of systemic risk. The nature of systemic risk can be 
distinguished by focusing on the cause of harm. Kaufman and Scott distinguish between macro 
and micro causes (summary in table 1) (Kaufman and Scott, 2003). A macro systemic risk is a ‘a 
big shock or macro-shock that produces nearly simultaneous, large, adverse effects on most or all 
of the domestic economy or system’ (Kaufman and Scott, 2003: 372). There is a single (and often 
sudden) common cause that affects all or most parts of the system directly. 
 
A micro systemic risk is when the initial cause or shock is only on one component of the system. 
The systemic risk is caused by the ‘transmission of the shock and potential spillover from one 
unit to others’. The transmission of the shock can occur directly or indirectly. In direct causation 
‘systemic risk is the risk of a chain reaction of falling interconnected dominos’ and implies direct 
physical causation between the interconnected elements.  
 
Indirect causations are ‘when one unit experiences adverse effects from a shock … uncertainty is 
created about the values of other units potentially also subject to the adverse effects from the 
same shock’. Causation is thus connected to human perceptions and understandings, which are 
limited and uncertain, and human interactions with elements of the system, possibly exaggerated 
with risk averse responses, and herding behaviour and contagion. Human responses in the chain 
of events can therefore be self-reinforcing and systemic harm becomes a ‘self-fulfilling-
prophecy’ (Kambhu, Weidman et al., 2007: 5). 
Table 1. Types of systemic risk (Kaufman and Scott, 2003) 
Macro A single big shock which impacts on all or most of the parts of a 
system – a common cause 
Micro (i) direct A single shock which impacts on only one or a small number of 
system parts. The systemic effect is a result of a chain reaction 
between physically interconnected elements – a ‘domino effect’  
Micro (ii) indirect A single shock which impacts on only one or a small number of 
system parts. The systemic effect is a result of human interaction 
with other elements, in particular the result of loss of confidence and 
herding or contagious behaviour 
These different categories of the causes of systemic risk relate closely to common 
understandings, particularly the notions of chain reaction and contagion, and provide a useful 
                                                 
1 For more detail on these debate see Bartle (2008) and Bartle and Vass (2008). 
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starting point. Nevertheless it should be noted that there is no easy consensus amongst academics 
and practitioners on the nature and significance of systemic risks in banking (Kambhu, Weidman 
et al., 2007: 8). 
 
While the concept of systemic risk has a high profile in banking and finance, it has been argued 
that the most common cause of banking failures is not systemic risk as commonly understood, ie 
chain reactions and contagion. ‘The evidence indicates that problems at one bank or at a group of 
banks do spill over to other banks in general, but almost exclusively to banks with the same or 
similar portfolio-risk exposures and subject to the same shock (Kaufman and Scott, 2003: 376-
377). In the US, ‘clustered bank failures’ are ‘almost always triggered by adverse conditions in 
the regional and national macro-economies or by the bursting of asset price bubbles, especially in 
real estate’ together with poorly performing or insolvent banks (Kaufman and Scott, 2003: 379). 
Healthy units are much less vulnerable to systemic shocks: ‘at the height of the banking crisis and 
bank runs in Chicago in 1932, liquidity problems and depositor runs rarely, if ever, drove 
economically solvent independent banks into insolvency’ (Kaufman and Scott, 2003: 379). 
 
Systemic risk in banking therefore appears to be less chain reaction and contagion than often 
thought to be, and more a result of common cause external circumstances. It also raises a 
question about systemic risk. Is it a systemic risk when the chain reaction or spillover is just a 
trigger for the failure of unhealthy units? Or is systemic risk something more – when the trigger 
from the chain reaction is sufficient shock in itself to cause the failure of healthy units? 
 
Complexity and systemic change 
Moving beyond causation towards process, there are some other important distinguishing features 
of systemic risk associated with the inherent complexity of systems. ‘Complexity’ is a widely 
used term to describe the difficulties of analysing large systems with many components. 
Complexity is more than just ‘complicated’ (Sajeva and Masera, 2006: 381); it  is qualitatively 
more than the difficulty involved in analysing systems with many sub components with 
complicated behavioural functions. It refers to systems which have features which make the 
prediction of system behaviour extremely difficult even if the properties of the component parts 
are well understood.  
 
The features of complexity include ‘nonlinearities, multiple stable states, hysteresis, contagion, 
and synchrony’ which ‘are features common to all complex adaptive systems’ (Kambhu, 
Weidman et al., 2007: 6). Complex systems also manifest the characteristics of ‘chaos’, one 
reading of which is high sensitivity to initial conditions meaning outcomes can be practically 
impossible to predict. Abrupt regime shifts can occur which in the economy, for example, can 
lead to a ‘transition to an inferior but stable equilibrium’ (Kambhu, Weidman et al., 2007: 2).  
 
Complexity has become a significant feature of the whole modern science and technological 
infrastructures. Science and technological developments progress in an incremental manner and 
not in a systemic or holistic way. Products and processes are added incrementally to a complex 
whole of science, technology, life, environment, society, politics and the economy. However, as 
is well known in systems analysis, there can be unexpected and unforeseen ‘emergent’ 
phenomena: 
Created for specific functions and without cognisance of the networked interconnectivity 
of life, technological products enter the living world as ‘foreign bodies’. Once inserted 
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into the ecology of life, they begin to interact with their networked environments and 
from that point onwards scientists and engineers have inescapably lost control over the 
effects of their creations (Adam and Loon, 2000: 6).  
Undoubtedly many risks and hazards have been reduced by science and technology, however, the 
important argument is that new qualitatively different systemic risks have arisen out of 
technological change. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, systems with a high degree of complexity apparently cannot be 
understood fully by scientific methods which means uncertainty becomes a distinctive feature. 
Uncertainty ‘reduces the strength of confidence in the estimated cause and effect chain’ (Klinke 
and Renn, 2006: 3). Systemic risk therefore appears to be replete with uncertainty; it appears to 
limit the effectiveness of statistical probabilistic analytical techniques and raises questions about 
how risk should be managed. It has been noted that ‘many quantitative risk management 
approaches rely too heavily on data from relatively benign periods and thus allow history to grant 
a false sense of security’ (Kambhu, Weidman et al., 2007: 18). 
 
3. Is systemic risk in the network industries important? 
 
Systemic risk is clearly a high profile issue in finance and banking and its frequent media 
reference in the current  financial crisis indicates it is much more than an arcane theoretical 
concept.2 However, is systemic risk in the network industries, a special category of risk which 
warrants special attention? One way of addressing this question is to consider what is problematic 
about systemic risk in general, though with particular reference to banking and the network 
industries. 
 
One important feature of systemic risk as noted above is that there is a high level of uncertainty 
in risk due to complexity, interconnectedness and interdependence. It is not only difficult to know 
precisely what the risks are, but in ever more complex systems it can be difficult to know what 
the potential hazards are. There is therefore an unknown vulnerability to potentially high and 
possibly catastrophic hazards. 
 
Perhaps the most obvious feature of systemic risk is the potential magnitude of economic damage 
and its geographic extent; they are wide ranging in scope and scale and transcend national 
borders (Klinke and Renn, 2006). The implication therefore is that other forms of risk are less in 
scope, bounded and contained. The speed of transmission of shocks is another inherent feature of 
systemic risk which can make it very difficult to respond in a focused way on the component 
parts affected (Kaufman and Scott, 2003: 375). 
 
Is systemic risk important in the network industries? What is clear that systemic risk is an explicit 
and central concept within much of the literature and practice on finance and banking.3 This 
contrasts with systemic risk in the critical infrastructure literature, particularly that associated 
                                                 
2 For example, ‘Now is the witching hour when we find out if we are in for systemic meltdown’, The Guardian, 
October 13, p28. 
3 See for example, CRMPG III, 2008, Bühler and Prokopczuk, 2007, Elsinger, Lehar et al., 2006. 
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with the network industries.4 In the network industries literature the concept ‘systemic risk’ is 
only used occasionally and often only in passing. 
 
One reason may be that many important risks and hazards in critical infrastructures do not appear 
to be systemic, eg train, plane and car crashes. Indeed in a special issue of the Journal of Risk 
Research on risk in critical infrastructures, one paper covered, airport risks, air travel risks, road 
safety, the transport of hazardous wastes and safety of a high speed train (Vrijling, van Gelder et 
al., 2004). Another paper considered the reliability of hydraulic structures for the seawall 
protection against flooding in the east coast of England and cliff stabilisation in the Isle of Wight 
(Schoustra, Mockett et al., 2004). It is possible to think of systemic consequences of some of 
these risks, e.g. an air crash causing widespread disruption to international flights, or the flooding 
of large areas (e.g. in the Netherlands) which impacts on other infrastructures. Nevertheless, these 
papers do not address the issue of systemic risk and the kinds of risks addressed are normally 
considered to be localised and bounded, albeit with severe consequences.  
 
However, infrastructures are ‘complex systems-of-systems’ thus subject to systemic risks and 
failures (Sajeva and Masera, 2006: 381). One analysis of critical infrastructure risk focuses both 
on the severe consequences of failures of critical infrastructure and on the systemic aspects 
(Hellström, 2007). Drawing on the US national strategy for critical infrastructure, Hellström, 
notes a ‘clear understanding of critical infrastructures as grounded in “critical nodes”, “cascading 
effects” or multiplicator effects, and the possibilities of “acting at a distance” which the 
interlinked nature of such systems offer’ (Hellström, 2007: 419). The ‘criticality’ of critical 
infrastructures is ‘not because they are important in general, but because they are strategically 
connected in such a way that they focus society’s total vulnerability to a few particular points in 
the system’ (Hellström, 2007: 427). This is indicative both of a general systemic quality, i.e. 
shocks or failures to component parts can have systemic effects but also that some component 
parts are much more significant and vulnerable than others. 
 
One infrastructure industry in which risks do appear to have a systemic component is electricity 
supply, although the concept of systemic risk is not as central and explicit as in finance and 
banking. Terms such as ‘cascading’ and ‘chain reaction’ are used more often and much of the 
description of infrastructure risks in the network industries appears to have at least some systemic 
component. In arguing for the need for ‘international risk governance’ (Gheorghe, 2006; 
Gheorghe, Masera et al., 2007) focus on electricity supply and particularly the systemic risks that 
arise from the interconnected European electricity supply infrastructure.5 They note that although 
the system is decentralised, i.e. it derives from the interconnection of national systems, 
‘disturbances can propagate all through it’ (Gheorghe, Masera et al., 2007, p9). However, 
although the term ‘systemic’ is occasionally used (Gheorghe, 2006, pxix), it is not systematic or 
explicit. The term ‘cascading’ is explicitly used to describe potential failures in electricity supply 
when one disruption can cause a second and so on (Zimmerman and Restrepo, 2006: 218) but 
they eschew the word ‘systemic’. For instance the SFOE (2003) report on the September 2003 
blackout in Italy makes no reference to the systemic nature of the incident. Instead, it uses several 
                                                 
4 See for example, Journal of Risk Research (7:6, September, 2004) Special Issue on Risk and vulnerability of 
critical infrastructures in which systemic risks are not considered. 
5 Arguments for international risk governance in electricity supply are also made in Kröger, 2008, IRGC, 2006, 
Sajeva and Masera 2006. 
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times the concept of cascade (cascade-style failure, cascading effect). Similarly, the UCTE 
(2006) report on the November 2006 pan-European disturbance refers many times to cascade 
tripping but not once to the systemic cause or effect. 
 
Electricity supply might be much more vulnerable to systemic failures than other network 
industries such as water (IRGC, 2006: 17) the variety of ‘criticality’ within electricity and water 
supply after varying types of disturbance. While disruptions to electricity supply can have severe 
repercussions in other sectors such as water or transport, major disruptions to water are unlikely 
to have effects on other infrastructures.  
 
Of the network industries in addition to electricity supply, information and communication 
technologies (ICT), particularly those associated with the internet, are seen as vulnerable to 
systemic risks. The threat of ‘cyber terrorism and computer virology’ is drawn on to describe the 
increasing systemic pressures in critical infrastructures (Hellström, 2007: 422). While many 
attacks on computer systems are aimed at individuals rather than infrastructure systems, attacks 
can have severe consequences on infrastructures and there are intentional ‘cascade-based attacks 
on important internet nodes’ (IRGC, 2006: 45). ICT and internet based systems are now highly 
integrated into the control of other major infrastructures such as electricity supply and transport 
and create another area of systemic vulnerability (IRGC, 2006: 28). 
 
There are therefore clearly some important systemic risks in the network industries even if they 
are not frequently described as such. This raises the question, why is systemic risk a central 
concept in banking and finance but not in the network industries. One reason might simply be 
cross-disciplinary differences in terminology. Language such as ‘cascading’, is more frequently 
used in electricity supply than systemic and the latter is used with other terms such as 
‘interdependency’, ‘interconnectedness’ and ‘propagation of disturbances’. However, even 
accounting for differences of terminology, the literature on systemic banking risk is much larger 
than similar literature in the network industries.   
 
A second argument is that systemic risk (and similar terminology) is much more established in 
banking and finance and more widely recognised as a problem. The history of systemic risk in 
finance and banking goes back a long way: runs on banks were common in the 19th century and 
some important early regulation of banking (e.g. in the 1930s) was to reduce systemic risk. 
Complexity and interconnectedness in banking and finance have also increased apace since the 
liberalisation and rapid globalisation of the sector in the late 20th century. By contrast, in the 19th 
and early 20th century the network industries were either not developed (electricity) or in their 
infancy (telecommunications, railways). Electricity infrastructure developed in the mid 20th 
century, with some limited international interconnection developed since the 1950s, particularly 
in Europe. Digitalisation and computer based communication was in its infancy in the 1960s and 
1970s and the internet and associated systems and technologies only become established in the 
1990s. It appears there that it is only in recent years with the development of greater complexity 
and interconnectedness of network industries (systems of systems) that systemic risk (and 
complexity phenomena) have become more distinct. 
 
There are other possible arguments based on differences between the sectors. Some aspects of 
finance are argued to be special and warrant special attention. For example, ‘financial market 
trading and post-trade processing have several distinctive features that distinguish them from 
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other network industries and make it difficult to directly apply standard analyses’ (Milne, 2007: 
2947). One of those features is that the network operates as both a one way and two way network. 
However, while there are undoubtedly special features of the sector, it is difficult to see this as a 
reason that systemic risk is especially important to this sector. There are many important network 
differences between network industries, such as ICT and electricity supply (in the former the 
network carries discrete and identifiable data packages while the latter network operates as a 
synchronized whole in which individual inputs and outputs cannot be identified once in the 
system), but this in itself does not mean that systemic risk is more important in one rather than 
the other. 
 
Speed of transmission is noted above to be a feature of systemic risk, the speed is such that 
failures or disruptions in individual units cannot be dealt with quick enough to prevent 
propagation to other parts of the system. It has been noted, for example, that ‘adverse shocks in 
the financial sector appear to be transmitted more rapidly than similar shocks in other sectors’ 
(Kaufman and Scott, 2003: 375). However, this argument seems untenable. In electricity supply 
faults can cascade to whole systems within minutes, sometimes seconds (Schläpfer and 
Glavitsch, 2006). 
 
A more credible argument is that the damages and costs are much worse in banking and finance 
than the network industries; they can last longer and are more uncertain. Major disruptions to 
electricity supply can be very costly, for example, the major loss of supply in north east US and 
Canada in August 2003 affected about 50 million people and was estimated to have cost between 
2 and 10 billion dollars (Kröger, 2008). However, the current financial crisis seems to be much 
more costly: many governments have paid out tens of billions and in some cases hundreds of 
billions to aid failing banks.  
 
However, perhaps most distinct difference between banking and electricity is uncertainty of the 
effects. All of the major disruptions in electricity supply between 2003 and 2006 lasted less than 
a day, while financial costs were undoubtedly high, disruptions to normal life were limited to a 
few hours. This will cause a lot of disruption to some people, it may involve many millions in 
costs, but generally experience indicates that its effects will be relatively limited, certain and 
bounded. Clearly if loss of supplies became more frequent with more widespread effects then 
confidence and trust may fall and this could involve much bigger costs.  
 
By contrast there is great uncertainty of effects crises in finance and banking in particular the 
extent to which they will it impact on the real economy. The financial crisis of the early 1930s 
had a huge effect on the wider economy with a depression that lasted for most of the decade 
while the financial crises of 1987 and 1998 had a much smaller impact on the wider economy 
(Kambhu, Weidman et al., 2007: 12). The current crisis is clearly affecting millions of people and 
costing billions but there is huge uncertainty about how long it will last and how severe the 
effects will be. Will ‘normal service’ be resumed in a few months or a year or two, or are we 
entering a prolonged downturn and economic turmoil? 
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Is systemic risk important in the network industries? a comparison of the network 
industries with banking and finance 
Issue Banking and finance Network industries 
Use of the 
terminology 
‘systemic’ 
Systemic risk established as a 
central problem and analytical 
concept for many decades  
Systemic risk not an established 
concept; it is only occasionally 
used - other terms such as 
‘cascading’ or ‘chain reaction’ 
more frequently used 
Are risks and hazards 
systemic? 
Have been recognised for over a 
century (notably bank runs), 
though some dispute just how 
systemic the risks are 
Many significant risks are not 
systemic, eg transport crashes, 
explosions at major industry 
facilities. But increasingly in the 
last two decades there are 
emerging significant systemic 
risks, particularly in electricity 
supply and ICT 
Are there special 
features which make 
systemic risk 
especially important? 
Some special features are claimed, 
eg speed of transmission, but 
difficult to see them as unique to 
the sector 
There are some special features of 
electricity supply and ICT, 
notably their interconnectedness, 
which make them vulnerable to 
systemic risk 
Are the consequences 
significant? 
Consequences on the whole 
economy and society are 
potentially very high. 
High level of uncertainty about  
the effects 
Consequences are potentially 
high, but the effects are normally 
bounded and constrained and 
more certain than in finance and 
banking 
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4. Systemic risk: a comparison of banking and electricity. 
 
Table 1 compares systemic risk in the banking and electricity sectors. Whereas systemic risks are 
well-documented in the banking sector (Kaufman and Scott, 2003), this is less the case for 
network industries in general. In the electricity sector, there is an abundant technical literature on 
blackouts (Andersson, Donalek et al., 2005; Ilic, Allen et al., 2005; Makarov, Reshetov et al., 
2005; Pourbeik, Kundur et al., 2006) but, relatively little specifically devoted to the systemic 
nature of risk. While mentioned, the concept of systemic risk is seldom unpacked. For example, 
most of the existing work on critical infrastructure deals with the concept of risk through 
“shaping factors”. Such factors include societal (public risk acceptance and awareness, 
urbanization, demography), system-related (degree of complexity, interconnectedness), 
technological (technology-related or infrastructure-related), natural (availability of resources, 
natural conditions) and institutional (market organization, government policy-making, legislation, 
regulation) factors (IRGC, 2006; Kröger, 2008). 
 
In less than 20 years, cross-border flows have increased from less than 100TWh to more than 320 
TWh in Europe alone. One can not conclude that higher levels of electricity exchange and 
increased demand automatically leads to increased risk/failure. For example, in the United States, 
the total number of operating reliability events has decreased 33% from 2002 to 20066. However, 
the number of high severity Category-4 events went up in 2005 and 20077.  It appears that “large 
disturbances often stem from a sequence of interrelated events that would otherwise be 
manageable if they appeared alone. The cascading often results from equipment failure or poor 
coordination. Thus, the improvement of existing substations and other equipment through 
refurbishing, constant inspection, and maintenance, and replacement of critical components is 
vital to the prevention of cascading events” (Andersson, Donalek et al., 2005). 
 
In addition, increased competition and open access to the transmission systems present new 
challenges to the reliable operation of the interconnected electric systems. As noted by (Kröger, 
2008), the increase of systemic risk is compounded by the development towards a highly 
integrated system of interdependent systems. That said, (Kendall, 2001) explored the possible 
relationship between electric power outages and market de-regulation and concluded that, at the 
time, deregulation itself had not resulted in a lasting increase in the incidence of power outages in 
the UK and United States8. 
 
 
6 Of the 29 events in 2006, 15 (52%) occurred due to equipment failures, while system protection mis-operations 
accounted for 31% and human errors accounted for 14%. 
7 Category 4:  An event results in any or combination of the following actions: a) system separation or islanding of 
more than 1,000 MW of load b) the loss of load (1,000 to 9,999 MW) ; Category 5:  An event results in any or 
combination of the following actions: a) the occurrence of an uncontrolled or cascading blackout, b) the loss of load 
(10,000 MW or more) 
8 Electricity transmission is not dependent on a single route, so failure due to a single component problem is reduced. 
However, an inherent risk of interconnected networks is the ‘domino effect’ – that is a system failure in one part of 
the network can quickly spread. Therefore, the active network needs appropriate design standards, fast-acting 
protection mechanisms and automatic reconfiguration equipment to address potentially higher fault levels. 
Table 1: Cross-sectoral comparison of systemic risks 
 Banking crisis Electricity crisis 
Triggering (crisis) event Insolvency, runs Natural event (lightening, strike) or device failure (loss of nuclear 
unit, tripping of a major tie-line, voltage collapse, protection system 
failure(1), relay system mis-operation), inadequate right-of-way 
maintenance 
Sector vulnerability(2) Low cash to assets, low capital, high 
demand 
Growth in demand, rise in cross-border trade, inadequate 
reinforcement of the power grid, poor coordination among 
neighbouring transmission system operators (TSOs)(3), frequency and 
voltage collapse, hidden failures(4), lack of investment in transmission 
infrastructure (within and between countries), failure to provide 
sufficient backup reserves 
Potential dangers Clustering of bank runs, credit 
availability, money supply efficiency, 
increased uncertainty, spillover beyond 
banks 
Integration of smaller systems into larger systems (facilitated by 
modern ICT thereby increasing complexity and enabling trans-
boundary propagation of disturbances); growing system oscillations; 
spillover to other network industries; uncoordinated generation 
supply response 
Type of SR Big shock, direct causation contagion, 
common shock contagion 
Big shock, direct causation contagion, common shock contagion 
Transmission channels Interconnectedness, similar markets, 
high leverage 
Interconnectedness, similar system, high level of cross-border 
exchange 
Requirements for contagious 
SR 
Interdependence, opaqueness Interdependence, coordination failure between operators 
Recent changes in SR Increased interconnection, technology 
advances 
Increased interconnection, next-generation networks (remote access 
arrangements), operating at the limit, market liberalization 
(unbundling of network elements and price) 
Historical evidence of 
contagious SR 
Direct causation (little), common shock 
(yes) 
Direct causation (yes), common shock (little) 
Corrective policies Private, public, rollback de-regulation Private, public (domestic and international), Re-regulation 
Source: Based on Kaufmann (2000) and adapted by authors. Note: (1) There are two major failure modes in protection system: “failure to operate” and “undesired 
tripping”. (2) The vulnerability of power systems has been traditionally considered mainly from the physical perspective; however attackers can provoke or 
amplify negative impacts of physical attacks to power systems by attacking information system or exploiting inappropriate decisions of (SOs). (3) In Europe, the 
TSOs are national entities subject to different regulatory regimes, ownership structures and operating conditions. Protective relays are involved in about 75% of 
major disturbances. (4) A hidden failure is defined to be a permanent defect that will cause a relay or a relay system to incorrectly and inappropriately remove a 
circuit element(s) as a direct consequence of another switching event. 
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Potential solutions 
Power grids have traditionally been designed to withstand without resulting in cascading 
events transmission outage contingencies of the N-1 or N-2 kind.9 However, in actual 
operation, power grids are potentially vulnerable to cascading outages. Reliable operations 
therefore require a risk-based-approach to monitoring and managing the probability an impact 
of potential cascading outages (Lee, 2008). Andersson, Donalek et al. (2005) argue that the 
introduction of reliability standards and regulatory clarification towards system reliability 
would reduce the risk of blackouts in the future. 
 
According to UCTE (2007) the risk and propagation of the disturbance can be limited by the 
creation of common emergency procedures by neighbouring transmission system operators 
(TSOs). For the most probable disturbed situations, remedial actions to bring the system back 
to the security limits have to be jointly coordinated, prepared, agreed and trained both at inter-
TSO and at national level. One should not forget the relationship between grid reliability and 
investment. It is often indicated that trends in transmission investment in North America 
generally have not kept pace with the growth in electricity demand, which has led to stressing 
the transmission system and, in some cases, compromising electric reliability. 
 
Governance 
On governance, there is also the need to have an independent source of reliability 
performance information. For example, in the USA, NERC commenced operations as the 
Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) in 2007 (assuming the responsibilities for electric 
reliability from its predecessor, the North American Electric Reliability Council). Perhaps the 
most significant feature of the US institutional framework is that it depends entirely on self-
regulation and peer review, without external enforcement powers. NERC develops both 
operating and planning guidance for the regional reliability councils. Operating policies flow 
down through standards to requirements and guides to system operators. Planning policies 
flow down through procedures, principles, and guides to system planners. NERC and the 
regional councils follow this process to establish and maintain adherence to the planning and 
operational guidance. The Department of Energy (DOE) has limited but significant authority 
with regard to electric reliability. 
 
Extending to other sectors 
The electricity sector was chosen because of its high degree of interconnectedness - the 
centrality of electricity in infrastructure interdependence (Rinaldi, Peerenboom et al., 2001)10. 
But other network industries, by their de facto systemic nature, should also be taken into 
account. Such industries would include ICT, railways. 
 
5. Systemic risk: the need for ‘risk governance’? 
 
There are therefore some important aspects of risk in the network industries, particularly 
electricity supply and ICT, which have a systemic quality. There are clearly some important 
cross-sectoral differences in systemic risk between banking in which it is a central concept 
and the network industries in which it is less clearly central. Nevertheless some general 
aspects of systemic risk apply in all sectors: the widespread and severe impact, 
                                                 
9 N-1 criterion asks whether the system operating with N devices still operate after the loss of any single one of 
them. The assumption is that the system will move from the N component steady-state condition and settle into 
steady-state at the N-l configuration. 
10 There are numerous types of interdependencies, including physical, cyber, geographic and logical. 
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interdependence, complexity and uncertainty of outcome. The question arises, is there a need 
for any special forms of governance to address systemic risk? 
 
Clearly the most fundamental aspect of systemic risk is its system nature and this suggests a 
the need for a system wide or centralised approach to governance. The two network industries 
of particular concern regarding systemic risk are electricity and ICT. Electricity has become 
internationalised on a continental basis (notably in Europe) while ICT has become globalised. 
Prima facie this suggests the need for centralised systemic risk governance at European level 
for electricity and global level for ICT. However, this centralised depiction of systemic risk 
does not fully capture its essence. As discussed above perhaps the most important systemic 
risks have micro causes, e.g. trees falling on power lines, which are then propagated through 
the whole system. This suggests that some aspects of systemic risk need to be managed on a 
decentralised basis. It particularly suggests that there needs to be a balance between 
centralised and decentralised governance depending on the type of risk. 
 
The previous sections concluded that although there are some key features of systemic risk 
common to all sectors, there are some important cross-sectoral differences in detail. This 
suggests the necessity of alignment of institutions of governance with the technologies. In a 
comparison of the railway and electricity sectors in the context of the significant regulatory 
reforms of the past two decades it has been suggested that there needs to be a coherence 
between the ‘critical institutional arrangements that support the technical functioning of the 
systems’ (Künneke and Finger, 2007: 332).  
 
From risk management to risk governance 
In relation to the network industries the increasing difficulties associated with systemic risk 
have led some authors to suggest the need to move from ‘risk management’ towards ‘risk 
governance’ (Sajeva and Masera, 2006; Kröger, 2008; Gheorghe et al, 2007; IRGC, 2006). 
The complexity and interconnectedness of the network industries, particularly electricity, 
mean that established forms of risk management are insufficient. Conventional forms of risk 
management focus on the strategies and techniques adopted by one or a small number of 
similar and closely connected organisations. While they may be appropriate for bounded non-
systemic risks, they are of limited effectiveness for systemic risks. Processes of risk 
governance are proposed which extend, though not wholly replace, risk management 
strategies where there are many and varied actors and institutions involved. ‘Risk governance 
admits the existence of multiple stakeholders, with their individual interests and viewpoints, 
in parallel with overall objectives (related to society as a whole).’ (Gheorghe et al, 2007, p16) 
 
These ideas of risk management and governance imply different approaches to risk and 
appear to reflect two fundamentally differing approaches which pervade the literature on risk 
(Royal Society, 1983, 1992; Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 142-148; Bartle, 2008). They are 
deeply embedded to the extent that they are often referred to as ‘two cultures’ (Hood and 
Jones, 1996: 11; Kemshall, 2002: xi-xiii). These might be able to assist in conceptualising the 
kind sort of governance is appropriate for systemic risk in the network industries. 
 
Scientific-technocratic and socio-political approaches to risk 
One model can be labelled variously as ‘scientific-rationalist’, ‘realist-absolutist’, ‘modernist’ 
or ‘scientific-technocratic’. Risk is an objective concept, separate from subjective perceptions 
and is normally understood as the statistical probability of the occurrence of the unwanted 
event multiplied by its severity (Hansson, 2007). Risk can be understood and analysed by 
mathematical, scientific and technological analysis, particularly statistical probabilistic 
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techniques and reliability engineering. Uncertainty is a separate concept from risk and applies 
to situations when there is insufficient data to reliably and meaningfully quantify outcome 
probabilities. Rational responses to risk can be developed based on the level of risk that 
society deems to be tolerable and regulatory remedies proposed on the basis on economic 
cost-benefit analysis. Risk policy-making and regulation therefore is primarily a technocratic 
process led by experts. 
 
A second model is variously labelled as ‘social-constructivist’, ‘relativist’, ‘political-
democratic’, ‘post-modernist’ (Adam and van Loon, 2000, p8) or ‘socio-political’. Risk 
cannot be easily technically conceived and quantified. Risk merges with uncertainty and 
subjective perceptions of risk merge with the objective. In particular, there is scepticism about 
the idea that quantifiable risks can be identified. There can also be different understandings 
and interpretations of risk between different types of experts and between experts and non-
experts. Leaving risk analysis to one body of experts is therefore insufficient and systems of 
risk governance and management have to be established to reflect this. Failures of risk 
management are often due to excessive faith in quantitative techniques and a futile aspiration 
towards more and more numerical accuracy at the cost of effective and more subtle 
understandings and analysis of the qualitative aspects of risk. Risk governance, regulation and 
management should therefore be a more democratic process with dialogue and input from a 
wide range of affected social and political actors. 
 
While two models can aid analysis and understanding, it should be noted that understandings 
of risk and risk governance are more subtle than this. There are some commonalities between 
the approaches and many subtle differences within each. Analysts often strive to move 
beyond rather rigid bipolar oppositions towards a more complete analysis (Adam and van 
Loon, 2000, p8). Also some analysts identify more than two approaches to risk governance. 
For example, (Hermansson, 2005) distinguishes three models: a ‘standard model’ close to the 
‘scientific-technocratic’ notion of risk, a ‘model of inviolable rights’ and a ‘model of 
procedural justice’. 
 
Prima facie the best way of handling risk in highly complex industries understood only by 
small communities of experts such as the network industries and finance and banking appears 
to be the technocratic approach. However, this appears to be close to ‘the tradition methods of 
risk management (applied for instance by electric power companies) [which] do not suffice 
for coping with the new challenges faced by the electricity structure in its entirety’ (Gheorghe 
et al, 2007, p16). Despite this and despite the recognition of the increased uncertainties 
involved in complex systems, the approach of some analyses is predominantly scientific-
technocratic. Two analyses of critical infrastructures such as energy and telecommunications 
(Zimmerman and Restrepo, 2006; Zio, 2007) both recognise the difficulties of scientific 
methods of risk analysis in the face of complex and interdependency: ‘the current quantitative 
methods of risk analysis seem not to be fully equipped to deal with the level of complexity 
inherent in such systems’ (Zio, 2007: 505). However, their approach is to overcoming these 
problems is better scientific analysis, for example, with ‘better quantitative measures of the 
degree of interdependency and the cascading effects’(Zimmerman and Restrepo, 2006: 228) 
or with ‘study of the topological properties of network systems [which] may give rise to new 
possibilities for exploring the vulnerabilities and the criticalities of critical infrastructures’ 
(Zio, 2007: 505). In essence, these approaches involve addressing the problem by more and 
better scientific analysis to understand systemic risk better, to reduce the uncertainties and 
better manage risk and uncertainty. 
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However, while attempts to gain greater understandings of systemic risk are necessary and 
welcome, it is not clear that they can overcome the problems of uncertainty due to 
complexity, interdependence and interconnectedness. While not denying the need to attempt 
to reduce uncertainty by scientific methods, it seems that decision making needs to go beyond 
this and incorporate processes which recognise that uncertainty is very likely to be always 
there. 
 
This suggests the need for a more socio-political oriented approach to risk. In this vein Klinke 
and Renn (2006) argue that a ‘deliberative approach’ to risk management and decision 
making is required. A first level of deliberation is between different types of experts with a 
‘goal to achieve a homogenous and consistent definition and explanation of the phenomenon 
in question as well as a clarification of dissenting views’. A second level requires moving 
beyond scientific input with information about the uncertainties brought into a deliberative 
arena which includes a wide range of stakeholders and public interest groups. This is 
primarily to decide on the level of precaution in decision making. 
 
Risk governance in the network industries 
A number of analyses are moving towards a more socio-political approach, for example, those 
authors referred to above who suggest the need to move towards ‘risk governance’ from ‘risk 
management’ (IRGC, 2006; Sajeva and Masera, 2006; Gheorghe, Masera et al., 2007; Kröger, 
2008). Another study suggests that complex infrastructure systems should be analysed as 
‘socio-technical systems’ in which technical systems themselves are not only complex but 
also involve the ‘variegated and penetrating involvement of human action, which, in all its 
forms, is able to affect, even critically to affect, the functioning of the system’ (Ottens, 
Franssen et al., 2006). Understanding and interpreting systems thus requires analysis of the 
relations between human actors and organisations and physical elements and systems.  
 
In relation to risk governance of critical infrastructures, Sajeva and Masera (2006, p391) 
suggest developing the principles of good governance recommended by the European 
Commission’s 2001 white paper on governance. Principles include openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence. In relation to risk governance, openness, for 
example, means ‘access to relevant information for the understanding of the risks … 
organisations involved are able to communicate potential risks’ and participation means 
‘active participation of experts, stakeholders, citizens and different viewpoints is crucial for a 
comprehensive consideration of the risk situations and the relevance of risk countermeasures’. 
 
Some institutional and policy suggestions have also been made for risk governance in the 
network industries, notably the governance of risk in electricity supply (Kröger, 2008, IRGC, 
2006). Institutional recommendations have been made in electricity at the European level to 
focus on risk and supply security. A modest suggestion is a ‘modification of the mission 
statements for the current organisations in Europe (such as the Florence Forum)’ (and 
possibly the EU regulatory networks which are to be institutionalised into the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators) and a more radical suggestion is the ‘institution of a 
European Council for the Security of Electric Power’ (Gheorghe et al, 2007, p18). Policy 
recommendations include inter alia strengthening the level of network security required in 
regulations, promoting technical research and analysis of infrastructure risks, promotion of 
best practices by all participants, and ensuring adequate dialogue with all key stakeholders in 
decision and rule making (IRGC, 2006, p54; Kröger, 2008, p1786).   
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However, while these are all useful and important suggestions, they suggest little in detail 
about the governance and institutional structures, nor do they focus explicitly on systemic risk 
and how it should be governed in the network industries. In particular, while more detail is 
indicated on technical methods, eg system analysis based on ‘an object-orientated, hybrid 
approach combining Monte Carlo and agent-based modelling techniques’ (Kröger, 2008, 
p1786), little detail is suggested on governance structures. 
 
Many important questions about governance structures and the governance of systemic risk 
and uncertainty need to be addressed. It might involve more analysis of potential failure 
scenarios and more engagement with variety of stakeholders about the scenarios and the level 
of caution required in addressing the risks.  
 
There are also difficult questions about the involvement of stakeholders. Given that systemic 
risk requires decentralised as well as centralised risk governance there are questions of 
vertical structure, ie which national, subnational, international stakeholders to involve and 
how. Horizontal questions of participation by stakeholders such as industrial users and 
individual consumers, trade unions, public interests such as environmental interests are also 
pertinent. As noted above, interconnectedness suggests at least more and closer working 
between TSOs in electricity supply. Interdependency and interconnectedness also means that 
participation might include a range of stakeholders from interconnected sectors, such as 
industry, technical experts, consumers and public interests. 
 
In addition to questions about who is involved there are questions about how they are 
involved and what their place is in the process. ‘Dialogue’ is frequently referred to in the 
above references but is this enough to address the uncertainties associated with systemic risk 
governance? There are wide range of ways of involvement, from information transparency, 
close consultation to co-decision making. 
 
Finally there are questions about how appropriate are current regulatory institutions in Europe 
such as the Florence forum, the regulatory networks and the new Agency for the Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators. A primary issue here is that these institutions developed specifically in 
response to the liberalised single European market in energy and particularly the need to 
manage new forms of competition across Europe. Is it appropriate for institutions which were 
developed primarily to manage competition to be modified to manage systemic risk? Or 
should systemic risk be managed entirely separately? 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Systemic risks and hazards are becoming increasingly important features of modern industrial 
society of which the network industries form a vital and central element. Nevertheless a 
comparison of the literature indicates that the idea of systemic risk is much less prominent in 
the network industries compared to banking and finance. This could perhaps indicate that 
systemic risk is somehow less important in the network industries. We argue in this paper, 
however, that systemic risk is very important in the network industries and it needs to be a 
considered more explicitly than hitherto in the governance of risk in the network industries. 
 
While comparison of banking and finance with the network industries reveals many 
differences, they are not enough to conclude that systemic risk is not important in the network 
industries. Two key reasons point to why systemic risk is much more high profile in banking 
than the network industries. First, it has a long and established history, at least a century and a  
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half in banking. Second, the potential consequences of systemic hazards are very high in 
banking and finance; they can affect the whole economy and society for many months and 
possibly years during which there is a high degree of uncertainty about their effects. While 
these features are clearly different to the network industries, this does not mean that systemic 
risk is not important in the latter. Systemic risk has only become significant in the past two 
decades in the network industries yet there are many uncertainties about just what the risks 
are. Although the consequences of systemic risks are likely to be much more bounded in the 
network industries than in banking, their consequences in terms of financial costs and 
disruptions to modern routines are likely to be very high and to be avoided as much as 
possible. 
 
This paper has also highlighted a number of technical differences between banking and one of 
the key network industries, electricity supply. Again, however, while these differences can 
impact on risk governance strategies, they are insufficient to argue that systemic risk is not 
important in the network industries. Some of the differences in systemic risk are due to the 
emerging nature of risk in the network industries compared to the established risks in 
banking. Thus, the key sectoral vulnerabilities in electricity are the rise in cross border trade, 
integration of different systems and operation outside of their original design parameters have 
become much more significant in the last two decades while the key vulnerabilities in finance 
and banking such as low capital, have been important in the last two centuries of banking.  
 
Systemic risk in the network industries is therefore very important and we argue that systemic 
risk and its governance need to be addressed more explicitly in the network industries. This is 
because of the potential severe and widespread consequences, the heightened uncertainty 
about the risks and potential for surprises, interdependence and interconnectedness, and the 
emerging nature of systemic risk in the network industries. 
 
We also argue that traditional technocratic forms of risk management and governance are not 
sufficient, particularly due because of heightened uncertainty and interdependence. 
Undoubtedly more and better scientific and technical analysis of systemic risk is necessary 
and important. However, unless and until the problems of uncertainty are overcome, which 
seems highly unlikely, other means of governing risk and uncertainty are required. In 
particular, judgements by different experts and different stakeholders are required about the 
nature of the uncertainty, about the potential hazards and their consequences and about the 
level of caution required. This requires a more participative and open form of risk 
governance, a form which draws as much on socio-political forms of governance as 
technocratic. 
 
This is recognised in part in the recent literature on risk governance of critical infrastructures 
but the literature says little about the participative governance structures which might be 
appropriate nor how they may be developed in practical terms in the patchwork that is the 
European regulatory environment for the network industries (Kröger, 2008; IRGC, 2006; 
Gheorghe et al, 2007; Sajeva and Masera, 2006). The patchwork, which includes the Florence 
forum and the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, has been developed 
primarily to manage competition across Europe. It is however not clear that they would be 
appropriate for the management of systemic risk. 
 
There are some particularly difficult questions about the involvement of stakeholders. 
Systemic risk requires decentralised as well as centralised risk governance so there are 
questions about the involvement of national, subnational, international stakeholders. There are 
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also questions of participation by stakeholders such as industrial users and individual 
consumers, trade unions and public interests. Participation might also include a range of 
stakeholders from interconnected sectors, such as industry, technical experts, consumers and 
public interests. In addition to questions about who is involved there are questions about how 
they are involved and what their place is in the process. There are wide range of ways of 
involvement, from information transparency, close consultation to co-decision making. 
 
This all suggests a research agenda focused on the following questions: 
• how is systemic risk currently governed at national and European levels in the network 
industries, particularly in relation to technocratic and socio-political forms of 
management and governance? 
• what are the strengths and weaknesses of current systemic risk governance and how 
might it be improved? 
• what might governance institutions, structures and processes look like at national and 
international levels in the context of emerging systemic risks in particular their cross-
national and cross-sectoral nature? How should uncertainty be addressed? In particular 
which stakeholders should be involved in systemic risk governance?  
• what sort of involvement should the various stakeholders have? Should it only be a 
limited form of information and dialogue, or should there be close consultation and co-
decision making amongst wide ranging stakeholders? 
• To what extent are existing institutions, which have been set up mainly for competition 
and trade, suitable and adaptable for the regulation of systemic risk, or should entirely 
separate institutions of risk governance be established? 
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